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Book Review – Glenn Morrison, The Heythrop Journal 49:3 (May, 2008), 535-536.

Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis and the Elements of Everyday Life. By John
Russon, Pp. viii, 162, State University of New York Press, 2003.

Traversing the meaning of being and reflecting upon the world of everyday human
experience, John Russon has introduced a heartening perspective of neurosis. Providing a
rational argument and logic to tear down the cold-hearted and stereotypical view of neurosis
(and psychosis), Russon brings to light the normalcy of our neurotic ways. He uncovers the
core of identity in the core of our embodiment – family and social life and activities such as
walking, eating, sleeping, urinating and defecating. Taking up a Heideggerian and even at
times, a Freudian posture, he prioritises the body and its intersubjective relation to the world
as the lens to examine neurotic experiences and tensions. In other words, our everyday bodily
practices reveal who we are.

Even though Russon’s study does not engage ethical metaphysics and its sense of otherness
and sacrifice for others as central to the identity of the human person, I want to suggest that
his work is a programmatic and creative masterpiece of philosophical reflection and
psychological analysis. I do not mean to be obsequious at all, but to acknowledge the
insightful contribution that Russon has made to provide an extension of Heidegger’s Being
and Time in a post-modern context. It is not an easy thing to bring together neurosis and
philosophy given the everyday inability inherent in professions to think beyond its own
domain and experience. Russon has put together many thought-provoking ideas, and among
these, I want to isolate his sense of the ‘I can’, an obvious reconstruction of the Heideggerian
Dasein.
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Russon’s sense of the ‘I can’ represents an existential, phenomenological and ontological
development of existence, consciousness and being. Like Heidegger’s notion of Dasein
which moves beyond Husserl’s emphasis on objective evidence towards an interpretation of
human nature’s corruption and its possibilities for discovering authentic existence, Russon’s
construction of the ‘I can’, articulates consciousness as the possibilities of embodied
experiences beyond knowledge. These experiences are beyond knowledge because they are
future-oriented and open to a veiled array of possibilities. This suggests that the innermost
core of our human identity contains our unknown, awaiting and embodied possibilities of
interaction with others. Here we have a programmatic reconstruction of Dasein as a means to
uncover the elements of everyday life and experience in neurotic behaviours. ‘I can’ signifies
the very possibilities for our embodied subjectivity in the world. Yet, lacking an ethical
metaphysical idea of otherness, the sense of ‘I can’ becomes restricted to its own-most or
self-transformative potential through, for example, the noble pursuits of education and
therapy.

In sum, Russon provides an insightful analysis of human experience, interpretation, emotions,
embodiment, memory, the relation to others (family and society), neurosis and philosophy.
However, the priority of the other and his/her demands for justice and mercy, hospitality and
for spiritual expression, remain absent. Russon acknowledges that he is a philosopher and not
a scientist or theologian. None the less, a philosopher’s work and writing does involve
something spiritual, that is, the very search for meaning. However, Russon does take up this
task by articulating the wonder of the self’s embodiment and openness. In search for truth, he
remarkably decodes our neurotic compulsions, provides them with meaning and with the
possibilities for self-transcendence through therapy and education. Perhaps, the most
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evocative and humbling emphasis of Russon’s engaging, creative and thought-provoking
work is that ‘being neurotic’ marks our essential human condition.

